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From kanun-ı kadim (ancient law) to umumun kuvveti (force of
people): historical context of the Ottoman constitutionalism
Erdem S€onmez
Department of History, Bilkent University, Ankara, Turkey
The Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements are considered to be the first clear
expressions of a desire for a constitutional and parliamentarian regime in the Ottoman
Empire. As already demonstrated in the existing literature, the foremost objective of the
Young Ottomans and the Young Turks was to orchestrate an institutionalized limitation to
the power and authority of the sultan, by effecting a constitution and parliament. On the
other hand, however, there is a consensus in the existing studies that it was the political
system of Europe, which had provided the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks with
the motives and inspiration for their political projects.1 Şerif Mardin, for instance, empha-
sized that the constitutionalist movements in the Ottoman Empire from the Patriotic Alli-
ance (_Ittifak-ı Hamiyet) to the Young Turks ‘thought of themselves as aiming to follow the
political lead of Europe’.2 Bernard Lewis also emphasized that the Young Ottomans and
the Young Turks ‘learned’ the concepts such as constitutionalism and parliament ‘from
their European teachers’.3 This narrative in the literature gained so much a hegemonic
character in time that many other prominent historians such as Tarık Zafer Tunaya,
Stanford Shaw, Roderic H. Davison, Kemal Karpat and Feroz Ahmad also took up this pat-
tern, refining and strengthening it.4
Needless to say, it is unviable to oppose this approach categorically as there is no
doubt that one of the major goals of the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks was to
integrate the Ottoman Empire into what they thought as the ‘Western World’.5 They did
not only introduce the political system and institutions of Europe, but also acquainted the
Ottoman public with its social and cultural structures. In many of his writings, for instance,
Namık Kemal praised such civic establishments as theatres, libraries and observatories in
Europe, even applauding a zoo in London in his article ‘Terakki’ (Progress).6 Therefore, one
could assert that the emphasis in the current literature mirrors the historical reality to a
great extent.
Nevertheless, existing studies on the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk movements
show a serious deficiency at the same time. Accepting the western influence as the sole
source of the constitutionalist movements’ political agenda, they concentrate on Euro-
pean impact in an isolated manner, thus overlooking not only the manifold sources of
Ottoman constitutionalism, but also the means of legitimation that the Young Ottomans
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and the Young Turks cultivated.7 Most importantly, perhaps, the historical context of the
Ottoman constitutionalism has hitherto been neglected.
This approach, which underlined the European influence as the sole factor, is a product,
and perhaps the final refuge, of the ‘modernization theory’. As it is well known, moderni-
zation theory presented the western political, economic and social transformations as a
universal experience. This approach considered that all features of ‘modernity’ were up
for adoption by the follower ‘traditional’ societies, which then ‘naturally’ transformed into
‘modernized’ ones.8 Furthermore, scholars usually heralded Turkey as one of the most
successful models of a universally defined ‘modernization process’, after the Second World
War.9 From this perspective, the ‘Ottoman and Turkish modernization’ was seen to be
succeeding as an elite-driven and institution-building process that took its inspiration
exclusively from the West.10
My own purpose here is not to criticize the modernization theory. This critique had
been done by scholars from 1970s onwards and the modernization theory was aban-
doned to a great extent.11 In addition to the theoretical dimension, thanks to the existing
studies on Ottoman history, which had been especially carried out by the early 1990s,
questioned the ‘modernization process’ of Turkey, and thus demonstrated the internal
dynamics of the social, economic and political transformation.
Nonetheless, in terms of intellectual history in general and the Ottoman constitutional-
ism in particular, the old paradigm is still considerably influential. In other words, the
accepted reading on the roots of the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements’ politi-
cal projects still bears traces of the modernization theory today, since it underlines that
the western institutions and governmental systems were the only political models of the
constitutionalist movements in the Ottoman Empire; and therefore, neglects the historical
context of the Young Ottoman and Young Turk thought.
The continuities between the early modern era and the nineteenth century, as well as
the Young Ottomans’ and the Young Turks’ perception of earlier political transformations
have been substantially ignored in reading nineteenth-century intellectual history. This
approach deems it unnecessary to examine the history of the previous 200 years, which
has been considered irrelevant to the constitutionalist thought of the nineteenth
century.12 As a result, the prevailing scholarly view on the Young Ottoman and the Young
Turk movements postulates that the concept of constitutionalism was solely and directly
based on the western model, imported by the constitutionalist movements to the Otto-
man Empire.
My aim here is to shed light on the historical context of the Young Ottoman and the
Young Turk movements. The existing systematic studies of the so-called ‘traditional
period’ of the Ottoman history serve as my point of departure. It is worth noting that my
approach sprang from Rifaʿat Ali Abou-El-Haj’s perspective that states political change in
the nineteenth-century Ottoman Empire depended as much on internal dynamics from
late sixteenth century on, as it did on external influences.13 Therefore, one of the major pil-
lars of this article is the thesis put forward by the Ottoman historiography that argues the
nineteenth-century transformations were a synthesis of a 200 year sequence of experi-
ments and ad hoc solutions.14
Briefly summarized, one significant theme that appears in the existing literature on the
Ottoman policy in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries is the power struggle
between the groups that aimed to limit the royal authority and the political position,
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aiming at strengthening the power base of the sultan.15 According to Baki Tezcan, this
bifurcation in the Ottoman polity began in the last quarter of the sixteenth century, in
response to the development of loci of powers, such as the vizier households and the
lords of the law.16 During the fierce struggle in defining the boundaries of royal authority,
the sultans’ powers became contested and dispersed. Instead of a state understood as
one imperial household, power shifted among elite households, divided by factional rival-
ries.17 Carter Findley recorded that factional rivalries, janissary revolts and ulema opposi-
tion vis-a-vis the absolutist policies of the Ottoman sultans, were recurrent themes of the
seventeenth century.18 The janissaries, in alliance with the men of pen, and ulema,
became a formidable obstacle to the palace’s autocracy. Hence, there was an open accep-
tance of the receding power of the Ottoman sultan in face of those pressure groups, by
the second half of the seventeenth century. Moreover, the charismatic model of leader-
ship became irrelevant since the Ottoman dynasty had lost much of its former power. In
its place, a collective leadership, based in power of the groups aimed at limiting the royal
prerogative, became consolidated. Abou-El-Haj emphasized that by the second half of the
seventeenth century, most of the sultans acted mainly as symbolic leaders, providing a
facade of continuity for the old practices as they helped to legitimize new ones.19 The sul-
tans, as Findley aptly stated, appeared as almost immobile figures in an endless pageant
of court ceremonies and religious rituals.20
Given this conflict-ridden historiography, my first goal is to hint at how the power strug-
gles in the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries were viewed by the Young
Ottomans and the Young Turks and how that contributed to their thought. In other words,
I seek to point out the means of legitimation that the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk
movements exploited and built continuity between themselves and the political position
that aimed to restrict the royal prerogative during the seventeenth and eighteenth centu-
ries. For this purpose, I will mainly concentrate on the writings of three pre-eminent figures
in the nineteenth-century intellectual history, _Ibrahim Şinasi, Namık Kemal and Ahmed Rıza,
each representing a different generation of Ottoman constitutionalism.
Şinasi: ‘Your Law Brings the Sultan into Line’
Şinasi, who is considered to have established the foundations of the Young Ottoman
thought, produced much of his intellectual work with obvious political motives, and the
objective that his political ideas could be followed through them.21 A notable theme
among his qasidas, for instance, was the eulogy of his patron, Mustafa Reşid Pasha.22 One
could consider that Şinasi’s eulogy of the personality and wisdom of the latter was only
natural because of the patronage relationship between them. However, if one takes a
closer look at the totality of his poems, it also becomes obvious that he went against the
common Ottoman practice and completely ignored Abdulaziz, who was in power when
his book was published. In addition, while praising Mustafa Reşid Pasha, who was consid-
ered the symbol of the Tanzimat bureaucracy, the clearest expression of the objective to
limit the power base of the sultan in the modern era, Şinasi strongly criticized the absolut-
ist period of Mahmud II.23
According to Şinasi, Mustafa Reşid Pasha guaranteed the security of right to life and
property in the Ottoman Empire with ‘law’, as the G€ulhane Rescript of 1839 was often
referred to. Therefore, Mustafa Reşid Pasha invalidated the period prior to the Tanzimat
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era precisely through the ‘law he established’.24 Şinasi portrayed the absolutist period of
Mahmud II as an era of tyranny and violence and as Butrus Abu-Manneh demonstrated a
century later, a time within Ottoman history, in which the rights to life, possession or hon-
our of the empire’s subjects, were utterly insecure.25 For Şinasi, people were merely slave
to despotism in the age of Mahmud II and they gained their freedom only with the ‘law of
Mustafa Reşid Pasha’.26 In a highly graphic description, Şinasi characterized Mahmud II as
a ‘contemptible butcher’ (‘cellâd-ı le’im’), a quite severe insult for an Ottoman sultan.27
Mustafa Reşid Pasha, on the other hand, was the very person who brought this ‘contempt-
ible butcher’ into line (‘Bildirir haddini sultana senin kanunun’).28
One theme that appears often in the literature on Şinasi is that he was a proponent of
‘westernization’ and ‘modernization’ projects. The implication was that these concepts left
a deep imprint on his emphasis on ‘law’.29 Thus, we are commonly led to believe that
Şinasi’s eulogy of Mustafa Reşid Pasha and the G€ulhane Rescript sprang from the con-
cepts of ‘civilization’, ‘enlightenment’, ‘Europeanization’ and so on.30 While, this commonly
held view that highlighted Şinasi’s westernist approach is to some extent self-explanatory,
considering it as the single explanation of Şinasi’s strong emphasis on ‘law’ is quite prob-
lematic, since this perspective analyses the political thought of Şinasi only within the
frame of his adherence to westernist or Europeanist inclinations.
In a similar vein, in Şerif Mardin’s view of Şinasi’s emphasis on ‘law’ severed him from
the traditional Ottoman political approach completely, since it included the concept of a
human lawgiver. For Şinasi, Mardin contended, ‘one of the most important contributions
of the grand vizier was that the latter [Mustafa Reşid Pasha] had established a fundamen-
tal law which set limits to the power of the sultan. It is this idea of a lawgiver other than
the ruler which is quite foreign to earlier Ottoman thought where law is either the law of
God, set once and for all (only to be modified by dint of interpretation or by outright dis-
tortion of the meaning), or that of the ruler, the edict of the sultan.’31
Mardin’s point of departure elucidates the meaning that Şinasi had attributed to the
concept of ‘law’, which was to be understood as limiting the power of the Ottoman sultan.
However, Mardin’s explanation is debatable since he argued that Şinasi’s attribution rep-
resents a clear break with Ottoman political thought and practice. If one takes a closer
look at the Ottoman political structure and its transformation throughout the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, and particularly how Şinasi and other Young Ottomans saw it, it
becomes obvious that no sharp break existed in Ottoman policy in terms of restricting
royal authority. The power bases, which sought to limit the royal authority during the sev-
enteenth and eighteenth centuries, too legitimized their claims and activities by frequent
allusions to the concepts, such as ‘law’, ‘the ancient law’ (kanun-ı kadim) and the ‘Ottoman
law’ (kanun-ı Osmani).32 Such was the case with the contemporaries of Murad III, for
instance, who criticized his autocratic policies highlighting the concept of law.33 In
another instance, a significant chronicle on the seventeenth-century Ottoman history, His-
tory of Tûĝı, faulted the absolutist rule of Osman II by accusing the latter and his support-
ers of deviating from ‘Ottoman law’. Accordingly, Tûĝı portrayed the political actors that
had dethroned Osman II, as the protectors of the law.34 In addition to Tûĝı, Katib Çelebi,
another chronicler sympathetic to the groups that aimed to limit the royal prerogative,
also used a similar justification: ‘On the same day the soldiers petitioned the sultan [Mus-
tafa] for execution of those who left the path of the ancient law (kanun-ı kadim) and
invented new laws.’35 Similarly, the opponents of the ‘New Order’ (nizam-ı cedid), a project
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aimed at modernizing the autocratic government, criticized Selim III for shunning away
from the ‘ancient law’. Moreover, the proponents of Selim III, tried to legitimize this project
by emphasizing the necessity of the replacement of the ‘ancient law’ by the ‘New Order’.36
According to Baki Tezcan, almost all historical texts written by those holding political
rank and aimed at limiting royal authority, opposed the autocratic policies of the sultans
and accused them of deviating from Ottoman tradition; these political agents presumed
that the Ottoman political tradition was based on the recognition of their political and
economic privileges which they had gained over time. Thus, for them, absolutist policies
meant abolition of their privileges, so to speak, a violation of their rights, and therefore, a
judicial issue. Hence, the sultans who deviated from ‘Ottoman law’ or ‘ancient law’ ought
to be dethroned.37 Consequently, in comparing Şinasi’s emphasis on the concept of ‘law’,
with the content of the historical texts that mirrored the power struggle during the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, one can trace certain similarities. In the same vein as the
groups that aimed to limit the royal prerogative throughout the seventeenth and eigh-
teenth centuries, Şinasi gave substance to the content of ‘law’ in terms of restricting the
power base of the sultan, as evinced in his lines ‘Your law brings the sultan into line’. In
this respect, one can consider him as a bearer of the political stand in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries that aimed at constraining the royal authority.
If there was continuity between Şinasi and the mentioned political actors of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries, in terms of restricting the power of the sultan, then
what were the breaking points? In other words, at what points Şinasi in particular and the
Young Ottomans and the Young Turks in general differed from those groups of the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries? One can find some clues for these in Şinasi’s foreword
to the first issue of his newspaper, which started to publish in 1860:
Since people living in a given social community are circumscribed in their actions by multifari-
ous legal obligations, it is quite natural that they should consider the expression of opinions
aimed at the protection of the interests of the patria part of the totality of their vested rights.
If tangible proof of this assertion is sought, it is sufficient to point to the political newspapers
of those civilized peoples whose limits of understanding have been expanded by the power
of knowledge.38
As already mentioned, Şinasi declared that the people had ‘rights’ in exchange for obli-
gations. The freedom of expression, for instance, constituted an integral part of these
rights. From this viewpoint, he sought to build a doctrine that legitimized the people’s
freedom of opinion and expression. Therefore, he explained his newspaper’s raison d'être
as being a tool of this right, hence using the press to create and improve public opinion.39
In this context, Şinasi not only popularized the crucial concept of ‘the Ottoman people’,
but also tried to portray public opinion as the opinion of the Ottoman people.40
As a result, Şinasi emphasized the importance of the public opinion in administrative
and governmental decisions. Kemal Karpat argued that Şinasi dedicated himself to inform
and educate the Ottoman public about state administration, world events and opinion
making.41 According to Şerif Mardin, employing journalism as a means for enlightening
the people was a significant innovation on its own. Most importantly, perhaps, Şinasi rec-
ognized the public as a legitimate participant of the politics and worked on the internali-
zation of this thought by the Ottoman people.42 Later on, he attempted to deliver his
readers the essentials of parliamentary government and defended the principle of ‘no
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taxation without representation’.43 From this viewpoint, one could assert that the con-
cepts such as parliament, public opinion, constitutional government and Ottoman people,
which would be identified later on with the names of Namık Kemal and Ahmed Rıza, ini-
tially became apparent in the writings of Şinasi.44
Namık Kemal: ‘Better to Obey a Bad Law than Allegiance to a Benevolent
Sultan’
Namık Kemal picked up where Şinasi left off. Kemal’s logic did not diverge from that of his
immediate predecessor, who sought to make the public a significant component of poli-
tics. Namık Kemal made the tone and frames of the endeavour, which were set by Şinasi,
more sophisticated. As Mardin emphasized, the kernel of Namık Kemal’s thought con-
sisted of a determined effort to introduce the concept of popular sovereignty into Otto-
man political thinking.45 In his article, Efkâr-ı Umumiye (Public Opinion), Namık Kemal
stressed that there was no power superior to public opinion and the force of people in
society, a formulation which brought forth the belief that birthright and personal freedom
belonged to the public force alone.46 He warned the people to be vigilant against the rul-
ers, since they could abuse the authority that they were warranted by the people. The
power of the public which ordinarily protected the individual from any source of attack
on his life or property, turned into a tool for this very violation, in the case of an abuse.
Hence, the damage inflicted by the government would parallel the harm of the state of
nature. For Namık Kemal, when the political morality of a society deteriorated, ‘a Louis
XIV’ sprang up and established an absolute monarchy over the society.47 Therefore, he dis-
played a strong emphasis on the political responsibility of the people to prevent despotic
tendencies, which governments could provoke.48
It is within this context that Namık Kemal portrayed Mustafa Reşid Pasha as the ‘con-
queror of civilization’, since he put an end to the absolutist period of Mahmud II by means
of ‘law’, before the public itself could assume any responsibility for it.49 In particular vein,
Namık Kemal stated, in his Ottoman History, that it was better to obey a bad law than to
pledge allegiance to a benevolent sultan,50 repeating the emphasis on the ‘rule of law’, a
distinctive feature of Şinasi’s political thought that preceded him. For Namık Kemal, the
G€ulhane Rescript closed an era51 in which ‘political morality’ deteriorated and Mahmud II
established an absolutist rule,52 and was declared precisely for the conservation of law.
Therefore, Mustafa Reşid Pasha not only guaranteed the right to life, property and honour
of the people via the inauguration of the Tanzimat,53 but also ‘saved the Ottoman Empire’
itself.54 As a result, echoing Şinasi, Namık Kemal described the reign of Mahmud II, who
reestablished the unlimited power of the Ottoman sultan, as a ‘period of unlawfulness
during which nobody could be sure of his life and property’.55 In this particular context,
Namık Kemal argued that Mustafa Reşid Pasha paved the way for constitutionalism by
ending the absolutist regime of Mahmud II.56
From Namık Kemal’s point of view, the legislative and executive powers united under
the rule of Âli and Fuad Pashas, despite the fact that Mustafa Reşid Pasha had provided a
sound basis for a constitutional regime.57 Thus, the government gained an arbitrary char-
acter in the hands of a few people, since there was not a supervisory control over the
administration.58 In this respect, his criticism was levelled at Âli and Fuad Pashas,59 but it
had wider implications. It is true that the criticism of Namık Kemal and the Young
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Ottomans against the high-ranking bureaucrats has received a lot of scholarly attention.
However, the commonly held view in the current literature is that their opposition con-
cerned itself solely with the Sublime Porte, and was not addressed to the sultan.60 In this
sense, existing studies of this subject show a serious deficiency, since they have hitherto
neglected the nub of the criticisms of the Young Ottomans against the absolutist rule.
From the promulgation of the Tanzimat up to 1871, the strings of political power were
not in the hands of an absolutist sultan. Rather, the Ottoman sultan was merely a symbolic
figure when the Young Ottoman movement was founded and flourished. In a political
environment that Âli and Fuad Pashas had established a power monopoly, the Young
Ottoman opposition to the high-ranking bureaucracy seemed most valid, rather than just
critical of a ‘figurehead sultan’.61 In this context, the Young Ottomans placed much greater
emphasis on seeking to restrict the power of the Sublime Porte by making the public an
integral component of the politics. As already mentioned, Namık Kemal repeatedly
pointed out the significance of people’s participation in politics by stating that in every
society, the right to sovereignty belonged to all.62 He even faulted the G€ulhane Rescript
for not including the freedom of opinion, the sovereignty of the people and constitution-
alism.63 On the other hand, when the palace tried to reestablish its absolute power follow-
ing the deaths of Âli and Fuad Pashas, the criticisms of the Young Ottoman movement
were directly aimed at the sultan and the palace. The Young Ottomans overtly character-
ized, in the years between 1871 and 1876, the absolutist era of Abdulaziz, as the ‘age of
atrocity’ and ‘despotism’.64 Furthermore, Namık Kemal portrayed Abdulaziz as a ‘traitor’,65
and compared the periods of high-ranking bureaucracy and Abdulaziz, and made it clear
that his preference lay with the former.66 Thus, the criticism of the Young Ottoman move-
ment was twofold. They not only rallied against the power of the Sublime Porte, but also
openly criticized the absolutist rule of the sultan, whenever necessary. They further deep-
ened the views of their predecessors, most notably Şinasi, who preached for the legiti-
mate participation of the people in political processes. What is more, the Young Ottomans
defended the containment of the autocratic policies of both the sultan and bureaucracy
by a constitutional and parliamentarian regime that would be the product of the people,
were they to form a political community.
Another theme that illuminates the struggle between the constitutionalists and abso-
lutists in the nineteenth century is whether or not there were different formulations of
Mahmud II and his reign than what Şinasi and Namık Kemal had proposed. To exemplify
one of these varied formulations, in his book €Uss-i Zafer (The Basis of Victory), which
reflected the official view of Mahmud II’s rule and published only two years after 1826,
Esad Efendi offered a quite dissimilar depiction than those observed in the writings of
Şinasi and Namık Kemal. By picturing Mahmud II as a reformer of the state, Esad Efendi
underlined that the reign of Mahmud II was an age of peace and happiness.67 In a similar
vein, the history textbooks of the Hamidian period characterized Mahmud II as the second
founder of the Ottoman Empire, since he started the ‘real progress’ of the state.68 Lastly,
as Christoph Neumann underscores, Ahmet Cevdet Pasha praised the absolutist practices
of Mahmud II, in his book Tarih-i Cevdet (History of Cevdet) also.69
In addition to their disagreements on the reign of Mahmud II, the constitutionalists and
absolutists also differed from each other on the interpretation of the Janissary Corps, one
of the most significant groups that limited the power base of the Ottoman sultan through
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Ş€ukr€u Hanioglu recorded that the
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constitutionalist movements in the nineteenth century did not necessarily see the sup-
pression of the Janissaries as ‘The Auspicious Incident’.70 Namık Kemal overtly stated his
views on the Janissaries as follows:
The Ottoman Empire was governed by the will of the community, a form of constitutionalism
so to speak, until the destruction of the Janissaries. The people themselves assumed the right
to administer, which they would delegate to parliament … The Janissaries were the armed
consultative assembly of the people.71
For Namık Kemal, the balance of power in the political system of the empire had been
destroyed due to the suppression of the Janissaries by Mahmud II, hence justice was
replaced by despotism.72 In the history textbooks of the Hamidian period, on the other
hand, the Janissaries were described as a restricting force that prevented the progress of
the empire.73 In a pamphlet he wrote, Mahmud Nedim Pasha, another supporter of the
absolutist rule of the nineteenth century, as well as the Hamidian autocracy later on,
accused the Janissaries of being unruly and characterized the corps as one of the main
bringers of corruption.74 Ahmet Cevdet Pasha also defended the suppression of the Janis-
saries as they usurped the state power.75
It must be noted that Namık Kemal’s somewhat exaggerated appraisal of the Janissary
issue could be considered a result of a teleological reading of Ottoman history. In this
respect, he sought to legitimize the constitutional regime by looking towards the Otto-
man practice prior to the nineteenth century. Therefore, along with his assessment of the
Janissaries, he also leaned towards other pressure groups that had restricted royal author-
ity in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. Namık Kemal openly declared that the
Ottoman Empire had always been a constitutional government, in which the ulema held
the legislative power, the viziers had the executive power, while the people in arms repre-
sented by the Janissary Corps controlled the action of the executive.76 According to him,
therefore, the establishment of a constitutional regime in the Ottoman Empire would not
be an innovation at all. On the contrary, instituting a mechanism of governmental control
would mean the refinement of a mode of government that had been in use in the empire
before the absolutism of Mahmud II.77
Last but not least, the question of fratricide, as the Young Ottomans and the Young
Turks understood it, was another one of the major problems within the power struggle
between the absolutists and their opponents through the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries, since having an alternative sultan at the palace was a point of leverage against
the existing sultan.78 It was precisely in this context that Namık Kemal modelled his severe
criticism of fratricide on Bayezit I for executing his brother Yakup Çelebi.79 For those who
were party to the power struggles of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, a sultan
could be deposed but the political system would still survive with the enthronement of
his brother; hence the incumbent sultan, being aware of this, would not exceed certain
limits.80 On balance, however, the sultans who had absolutist political projects as Osman
II or Murad IV executed their brothers to eliminate the alternative candidates for the
throne.81 The fratricide came to an end as a result of a crucial consensus between the
absolutists and their opponents about the limits of royal authority.82 With all this in mind,
Namık Kemal’s sharp criticisms against fratricide in general and Bayezit I for killing his
brother Yakup in particular, create an impression that he spoke through a discourse within
the frame of the power struggle in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
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Ahmed Rıza: ‘The Palace is ours. The state is ours. We are the people, so the
right is ours’
Şerif Mardin stated that the intellectual depth of the Young Turks was rather frivolous in
comparison with their predecessors, the Young Ottomans.83 The Young Turks, for Mardin,
could not formulate any original or peculiar theory, and used political ideas only selec-
tively.84 Although Ahmed Rıza came to be seen as an exceptional figure within the group,
he too shared the same limitations of his intellectual milieu. Despite these intellectual
impediments of the period, however, both Ahmed Rıza and the Young Turks correlated
their constitutionalist opposition strongly with the activities of the groups that sought to
limit royal authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, as Şinasi and Namık
Kemal had done before them.85
It must be noted, first of all, that Ahmed Rıza and other contributors to Meşveret (Con-
sultation), one of the leading newspapers and the intellectual outlet of the Young Turk
movement, underscored the concept of ‘law’ against the absolutist Hamidian regime. Sim-
ilar to the political position that aimed to limit the royal prerogative in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, Ahmed Rıza and his followers sought to restrict the sultan’s
power, through a discourse framed by law. In this context, Halil Ganem, a significant con-
tributor to Meşveret, notably underscored that it was the ‘law that had the importance,
not the sultan’ (ehemmiyet kanundadır, padişahta degil).86 Moreover, as an article pub-
lished in another outstanding Young Turk newspaper Mizan (Balance) in 1896 put it, if the
gathering of Parliament was not possible under the existing circumstances, the sole mea-
sure for the salvation of the state was then to accept the principle of consultation. The
writer declared that everyone in the empire, including the sultan, had to obey the judge-
ments of law, even when it was inadequate or insufficient.87 In a similar vein, Ahmed Rıza
stressed that their duty, as a group, was to remain within the confines of justice and the
laws of the Ottoman Empire. The crucial point here, as also emphasized by Ahmed Rıza,
was that the Young Turks did not accept a power superior to the law, which was their
unique guiding principle.88
Second, in contrast to the accepted interpretations of Ottoman constitutionalism, one
could argue that the Young Turks were well aware of dissimilarities between Ottoman his-
tory and the European past. Rather than perceiving the western path and transformations
as universal experiences, they sometimes highlighted the very uniqueness of each soci-
ety’s political struggles and institutions. For instance, an article printed in Mizan overtly
reflected the Young Turks’ perception of the peculiarities of Ottoman history. The article
maintained that every state had its own distinctive character, morality and national history
and the political, civil and social revolutions arose from sui generis conditions in each soci-
ety; at times, attaining entirely different outcomes. Therefore, appealing to European his-
tory would be a great mistake in exploring the reasons for the reforms in the Ottoman
Empire.89
In keeping with that perspective, Ahmed Rıza and his followers frequently turned to
Ottoman history to legitimize their political projects. For example, in an article published
in Meşveret in 1896, they argued, not unlike Namık Kemal, that a form of constitutionalism
had already been established in Ottoman history,90 in which ‘affairs of state … had been
consulted in the Imperial Council. The Viziers, pashas … grand vizier and the ulema dis-
cussed the topics without hesitation.’91 Ahmed Rıza laid a particular stress on the
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separation of powers in Ottoman policy prior to the nineteenth century.92 According to
him, the empire had been governed primarily through consultation with the sultans, the
notables and the ministers of state.93 However, Ahmed Rıza underlined that some sultans
acted above the law and in time turned away from the consultation principle due to their
‘ignorance’ and ‘unruly despotism’. Moreover, he added, those sultans not only tyrannized
the people, but even their own brothers, touching upon the negative role of the autocratic
sultans who singlehandedly ‘prevented the progress of sciences and education’. It was
under these circumstances, Ahmed Rıza contended, that the empire started to decline, as
a direct result of absolutism.94 Nonetheless, he also emphasized that the Ottoman people
‘had never submitted to abjection’, and thus, they had never obeyed autocratic sultans,95
clarifying the matter as follows: ‘The sultans who had not recognized the order and the
rule of law … had been overpowered by … the armed forces of Janissaries and cautious
administration of the notables.’96 The power of the two parties, that is the Janissaries and
the ulema, Ahmed Rıza further asserted, had protected the laws and customs of the
country.97
In conjunction with Ahmed Rıza’s position, other Young Turks also highlighted the role
of the ulema and the Janissaries in the Ottoman history. In terms of limiting the royal
authority, the Young Turks attributed great importance to both of these groups and their
political activities. For instance, an article that appeared in Şura-yı €Ummet (Council of the
People), the central organ of the Young Turk movement after 1902, stated how the Janis-
saries safeguarded the empire in the past by keeping their weapons pointed at those sul-
tans ‘who had wounded the honor of the Ottoman people by tyranny’.98 In the aftermath
of the 1908 revolution, the same newspaper published another article, entitled ‘Memories
of Our Internal Politics’, and took a clear stance that the Janissary Corps had been one of
the major barriers for the absolutist sultans in attaining and exercising more power in the
Ottoman history.99
Moreover, it was commonplace to evoke the dethronement narratives of the autocratic
sultans in the writings of the Young Turks. An article printed in the first issue of Meşveret
depicted the deposition of Ahmed III in 1730, culminated with the ‘uprising of the people’
because of his absolutist tendencies,100 while another one recited the dethronement and
murder of Ibrahim I in 1648, by an alliance between the ulema, high officials and the Janis-
sary Corps.101 Şura-yı €Ummet, also made common references to the upheavals against
despotism throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries and the depositions of
the sultans such as Osman II, Mustafa I, Mehmed IV and Ahmed III which had been accom-
plished through the endeavours of the Ottoman people, for the sake of the country.102
It is important to note in this context that the Sublime Porte, another locus of political
power that had limited the royal authority in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries,
had been characterized by Ahmed Rıza and the Young Turks as the ‘hope of prosperity’
(€umid-i saadet kapısı). Ahmed Rıza further pointed that the Sublime Porte had been ‘an
asylum for the people’ as it had deemed their grievances and criticism important and had
preserved ‘order and law’. Yet, after the death of the great and powerful grand vizier Mus-
tafa Reşid Pasha, he continued, the palace once again felt entitled to intervene in politics.
Ahmed Rıza argued that despite the commencement of provincial councils which com-
prised the notables and the Council of the State, which was composed of Muslims and
Christians in the capital city, the realm of politics could not be spared from ‘despotism
and arbitrary intervention of the Palace’. For Ahmed Rıza, there was only one solution
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against ‘despotism and arbitrary intervention’ of the sultan, and that was to break away
with the old regime and consequently replace it with a new one103:
There seemed no other way than to change the type of government (usul-i idare). The Consti-
tution promulgated. Sultan Hamid using the excuse of the defeat in the Russian War, seized
the mission, influence and independence of the Sublime Porte. He suspended the Parliament
and the Senate. He began destroying the old foundations and customs. He, one by one, dev-
astated the powers that could prevent his obstinate will. The government, the state was
merely reduced to the personality of the sultan. The law was replaced with decrees and impe-
rial orders that were arranged by ignorant court chamberlains and wizard sheiks … in the pal-
ace cellars. The statutes of the canonical law and order declined. This corruption, this
interregnum is a result of the sultan’s ignorance. Therefore, the sultan has the entire responsi-
bility of calamities and tyranny … Emphatically, a sultan, who confined the government to
himself and fostered away the people from the politics, is responsible for … the defeat and
perpetual crisis.104
Halil Ganem reflected a similar attitude on absolutism and underlined the importance
of the Sublime Porte in constraining the royal authority. In one of his writings, he con-
noted that if reinstating the constitutional regime was not possible at the time being, it
was then necessary to restore the Sublime Porte to its previous powerful position. After
confirming the essentiality of a strong Sublime Porte, ‘which had increased the glory and
prosperity of the country’ for centuries, he emphasized the ‘independence’ of the grand
vizier from the palace. According to him, the Sublime Porte was one of the major institu-
tions that could stand against the interventions of the palace, which caused, in Ganem’s
view, the predicament of the country.105
In the same manner as Ahmed Rıza, other writers of Meşveret severely criticized the
Hamidian policy for neutralizing the power of the Sublime Porte. An article published in
the first issue of the newspaper contended that the sultan was the sole responsible of the
despotism in the empire since he had subdued ‘the most powerful political institution in
the world’.106 Again, Halil Ganem stressed that Abdulhamid II destroyed ‘the great organi-
zation’ of the Sublime Porte, which had been ‘a product of successive endeavors of
K€opr€ul€us, Mustafa Reşid Pashas, Âlis, and Mithads’, describing the interference of the pal-
ace in the affairs of state as ‘serious madness’107:
High officials, marshals, pashas are all slaves of the sultan. If any one of them … unmasks the
dreadful circumstances, he would immediately fall victim to royal wrath and be exiled. The
law and other regulations do not hold any significance. The sultan can abolish all of them at
will. There is no governmental wisdom in Turkey anymore. The government is limited to the
sultan’s will and pleasure. The sultan tramples on… law and justice.108
By the same token, Ahmed Rıza recorded that the Hamidian rule had eliminated all the
‘adherents of freedom and reform’ within the ranks of ulema and high officials.109 An arti-
cle that appeared in Şura-yı €Ummet in 1905 also stressed this point and related the auto-
cratic character of the regime to the deficiency of the high officials.110 Another
commentary that appeared in Meşveret faulted the sultan for the destruction of both old
and new institutions, order and law, by overthrowing high-ranking bureaucrats and the
ministers.111 Moreover, according to Ahmed Rıza, Abdulhamid’s absolutist regime was a
direct result of the ‘absence of an independent cabinet of ministers … ulema … and a
Senate and Parliament … that supervise the execution of laws’,112 a regime in which ‘no
one is sure of his life and property’.113
126 E. S€ONMEZ
It is noteworthy, in this context that alluding to the G€ulhane Rescript, by emphasizing
the significance of security of life and property,114 denotes that the Young Turks identified
the Hamidian period with the absolutist reign of Mahmud II. In this conjuncture, Prince
Sabahaddin, another significant Young Turk leader, took up the views of Namık Kemal
and stated almost 30 years after him that Mustafa Reşid Pasha was the first of the constitu-
tionalists who realized that a state could not survive with an autocratic regime amid rival
states. For Sabahaddin, Mustafa Reşid Pasha manifested that the salvation of the empire
was due to the unity of the people under the aegis of the Ottoman patria.115 Other Young
Turks also concentrated on the antagonism between tyranny and personal liberty. For
instance, an article published in 1896 sought to demonstrate the correlation between the
absence of security of life and absolutist character of the Hamidian rule.116
In sum, Ahmed Rıza accused Abdulhamid II of being ‘the major person responsible for
and the sole perpetrator of the tyranny’ because of his absolutist rule.117 In line with
Şinasi, who portrayed Mahmud II as ‘contemptible butcher’, Ahmed Rıza declared that Sul-
tan Abdulhamid was malicious,118 ‘brutal and a despotic ignoramus’ who did not deserve
the throne.119 The country, Ahmed Rıza further claimed, was ‘entrusted to the Ottoman
people by their forefathers’, and by no means the property of the sultan.120 In the same
manner as Ahmed Rıza, Tunalı Hilmi, another outstanding Young Turk leader, defended
that the state was not identical with the sultan and that the sultan was only an intendant
of the state affairs.121 In one of his articles published in Mizan, Tunalı Hilmi put a particular
emphasis on the difference between the dynasty and the state; and equated the latter
with the Ottoman people.122 Hence, the Young Turks repeated the discourse of Şinasi and
Namık Kemal that pertained to making the public a significant component of Ottoman
policy.123 Therefore, Meşveret writers underscored that the Ottoman state was founded
not only by the Ottoman dynasty, but also by the Ottoman people themselves.124 Ahmed
Rıza coined the core of the argument famously as follows: ‘The Palace is ours. The state is
ours. We are the people, so the right is ours.’125 Another article published in Meşveret also
underlined that ‘to demand justice and work for the prosperity of the patria were both
the duty and the right of each and every Ottoman’.126 Finally, as well as this mission and
right, ‘all Ottomans’ were called on to struggle for the reinstatement of the constitutional
regime against the absolutist rule of Abdulhamid II.127 Congruent to this call was a vision
of the status of the sultan as the ‘chief servant’ (serhademe) of the Ottoman Empire.128
This perfectly paralleled the purposes of the political position that had aimed to restrict
royal authority during the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Conclusion
What was the major source of inspiration for the Young Ottoman and Young Turk move-
ments’ political projects? This question cannot be tied to one single fact. A child of the
modernization theory, the hegemonic narrative on the Ottoman constitutionalism that
emphasizes the European governmental systems was the sole political model of the
Young Ottomans and the Young Turks, has become quite insufficient for understanding
the historical context of these movements. For many reasons, including this one, this
approach turns a blind eye not only to the power struggles and political transformations
throughout the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, but also how the Young Ottomans
and the Young Turks viewed these earlier political struggles. Therefore, this narrative
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entirely overlooks both the political powers whose purpose was to limit the royal authority
vis-a-vis the absolutist policies of the Ottoman sultans before the nineteenth century, and
their perception by the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements. However, compar-
ing the opponents of the absolutist rule of the sultan throughout the 300 years, one can
discern some similarities and indicators of the consciousness that the nineteenth-century
constitutionalism had about their predecessors.
As I discussed above, the outstanding themes in the writings of the Young Ottomans
and the Young Turks, such as public opinion, freedom of expression, political representa-
tion or constitution, had already been in circulation throughout Europe in the eighteenth
and the nineteenth centuries. The constitutionalist movements put a particular emphasis
on a new political actor, differently from the opponents of absolutism in the seventeenth
and eighteenth centuries, in their struggle for constraining the royal authority: the people.
Consequently, they were involved in making the public the fulcrum of their political goal,
that is the proclamation of a constitutional and parliamentarian regime. Hence, the Young
Ottoman and the Young Turk movements promoted the idea that the people were not
only the major guarantor of freedom, but also constituted the main obstacle to absolutism
of a sultan or bureaucracy.
Therefore, the fine line between the constitutionalists of the nineteenth century and
the forces that aimed to limit absolutism in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries
was the demand for a concrete constitution and a parliament. Although this key differ-
ence was intended for the institutionalization of restricting the royal authority, they met
on a common ground. At the outset, both groups that opposed autocracy in the seven-
teenth and eighteenth centuries and constitutionalist movements in the nineteenth cen-
tury attributed great importance to the concept of ‘law’ against the power base of the
Ottoman sultan. In parallel with the accusation of deviating from ‘Ottoman law’ or ‘ancient
law’ through the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Young Ottomans and the
Young Turks also gave substance to the content of ‘law’ in terms of limiting the power of
the sultan.
Second, the strong criticism against the absolutist sultans, such as Osman II, Murad IV,
Mahmud II and Abdulhamid II was another theme that corresponds to the opponents of
the autocracy throughout the 300 year period. On the other hand, in parallel with the
political stand in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, the Young Ottomans and the
Young Turks severely faulted the fratricide, since having an alternative sultan at the palace
was a point of leverage against the existing sultan. Ahmed Rıza, for instance, reviled
Abdulhamid II for the imprisonment of the princes129 and declared that the Young Turks
‘would acknowledge’ the reign of ‘Prince Murad or Mehmed Reşad’, if they would recog-
nize the constitution.130 Moreover, Meşveret published numerous articles of the ulema
members on fratricide and right of succession. These writings sought to legitimize
dethronement of Abdulhamid II by emphasizing that the right of succession and caliphate
did not belong to him.131
Constitutionalist movements interpreted the Ottoman history in a utilitarian and teleo-
logical manner. Therefore, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks surveyed the Otto-
man past, without omitting to emphasize its dissimilarities with the European history,
through a periodization based on a dichotomy of the reigns of absolutist sultans versus
the era of justice and law. Within this dichotomy, the Young Ottoman and the Young Turk
movements openly advocated the ‘ulema and janissary’ ‘parties’ in the seventeenth and
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eighteenth centuries due to the aimed limitation of the royal authority. These traditional
‘parties’ were characterized as the foundational organizations of the empire and bases of
justice and order, since they were considered as barriers to the sultan’s autocratic power.
Moreover, the constitutionalist movements cherished the Sublime Porte and the viziers
such as K€opr€ul€u Mehmed Pasha, for reducing the Ottoman sultan to a symbolic figure.
There is no doubt that this perspective is a significant indicator of the consciousness that
the Young Ottoman and Young Turk movements had about the power struggle during
the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries.
Connected to this aspect, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks made the power
balance and separation of powers within the Ottoman policy the focus of their attention.
In consequence, they explained their political projects with reference to the Ottoman
institutions, which had been constructed by the groups that aimed at limiting the royal
prerogative in the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries. What is more, they even argued
that the empire was governed by a form of constitutionalism due to the existence of those
institutions and political actors. They, therefore, defended that the establishment of a con-
stitutional regime would not be a new practice. From this viewpoint, it is no coincidence
that the neutralization of those institutions and power groups during the reign of absolut-
ist sultans was considered as tyranny by the constitutionalist movements.
All in all, the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks defended the institutionalization of
limiting the royal authority by a constitutional and parliamentarian regime, since the abso-
lutist sultans could diverge from the path of the noninstitutional ‘law’ and neutralize the
traditional ‘parties’ which had been against autocracy. The constitutionalist movements
often correlated their goals with the political stand in the seventeenth and eighteenth
centuries that sought to restrict the power of the sultan. In other words, the power strug-
gle in the Ottoman policy before the nineteenth century, found its echo in the writings of
the Young Ottomans and the Young Turks. With all these in mind, one could argue that
along with the European political model, one of the major mainstays of the constitutional-
ist movements for their political aims was the Ottoman practice prior to the nineteenth
century.
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see Namık Kemal, ‘Maarif’, _Ibret, no.16, 28 Rebi’€ulâhir 1289-22 Haziran 1288 [1872]; idem,
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37. Tezcan, ‘“Genç” Osman Neden Tahttan _Indirildi?’, pp.612. Also see €Oz, Kanun-ı Kadimin
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H€urriyet’, in T€urkiye’de Toplum ve Siyaset, 18th ed. (_Istanbul: _Iletişim Yayınları, 2011), p.268;
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115. Prens Sabahaddin, ‘Cennetmekân Abd€ulmecid Hanın Ahfâd-ı Necibeleri ve Beyanname-i
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